Why retailers cluster: An agent model of location choice on supply chains by Arthur Huang & David Levinson
1 Introduction
Rules governing the agglomeration and dispersion of economic behavior depend on
numerous factors that may impact firms' motivations and strategies. Empirical studies
have found that hierarchical distributions of economic activities and resources exist in
almost every city, region, and nation [such as the US carpet production industry
concentrated in Dalton, Georgia (Krugman, 1991a) and the Italian textile industry in
Prato (Porter, 1990)]. From a systems perspective, urban areas are not only concen-
trations of places and people, but also ``systems of organized complexity'' where a large
number of quantities vary simultaneously and ``[are interrelated] into an organic whole''
(Jacobs, 1961, page 432).
Adopting a similar view, we attempt to understand what can promote the concen-
tration of human activities. This understanding suggests two insights we need to
consider in modeling this phenomenon: first, numerous supply chains are interwoven
in the urban milieu; second, structural and behavioral patterns of cities result from all
kinds of economic agents' interactions. Our interest in the microfoundation of the
clustering of retail businesses leads us to study retailers' relationships with suppliers
and consumers, and their impacts on large-scale clustering patterns.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review literature on
the mechanism of business clustering and the agent-based approach in modeling urban
systems. In section 3 we describe our agent-based framework of a three-layer supply
chain network. Section 4 displays and analyzes the simulation results. The implications
of the findings are discussed in section 5. Lastly, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
Business clustering patterns have been a topic of extensive study. Traditional economic
geography theories explained spatial distributions mainly through differences in under-
lying characteristics: say, geography, labor, and products (Christaller,1933; Lo « sch,1940;
Marshall, 1890; Ottaviano and Ouga, 1998; Weber, 1909). For instance, central place
theory posits a hierarchy of communities in terms of a variety of stores, where goods of
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doi:10.1068/b36018higher order tend to stay farther away from each other than goods of lower order in that
they serve a larger threshold population; moreover, higher order places offer all the
goods offered at lower order ones, but not vice versa (Christaller, 1933). The findings
are very intriguing; Christaller's theory, nevertheless, cannot explain how such patterns
gradually emerge.
When researchers began to search for the `invisible hand' that contributes to
agglomeration, they resorted to the microexplanations with different hypotheses about
the causes, such as pure competition (Hotelling, 1929), different orders (by importance)
of food (Eaton and Lipsey, 1982; Quinzii and Thisse, 1990), transport cost (Fujita
and Ogawa, 1982), economies of scope (Fujita et al, 1988), and economies of scale and
imperfect competition (Krugman, 1991b). Krugman (1991b; 1996) further argued that
firm location choice is balanced by centripetal and centrifugal forces. The centripetal
forces include market-size effects, thick labor markets, and pure external economies;
the centrifugal forces include high land rents, immobile factors, and pure external
diseconomies. In addition, some other research found that the interactions between
upstream and downstream firms can result in agglomeration, wherein multiple equi-
libria may exist (Krugman and Venables, 1995; 1996). While these models implied the
functioning of supply chains, they did not explicate the balancing forces stemming from
the interactions of different business agents.
Since the 1960s, with the development of computing technology, many computer-
ized prototype models have been built to assist planning and policy development in
metropolitan areas; most models were mathematically or behaviorally based. Examples
include the highly disaggregated EMPIRIC model (Hill et al, 1966), the Detroit proto-
type of the National Bureau of Economic Research Urban Simulation Model (Ingram
et al, 1972), the TRANUS model (de la Barra et al, 1984), the ITLUP model (Putman,
1991), the MEPLAN model (Hunt and Simmonds, 1993), the California Urban Futures
models (Landis, 1994; Landis and Zhang, 1998) [see Wegener (2004) for a historical
review]. Yet such models did not adequately tackle the increasing complexities of the
interactions between a variety of components in urban systems. To meet this challenge,
some new planning support systems have been developed. A case in point is the
UrbanSim program which incorporated the interactions between land use, transporta-
tion, environment, and urban policies by modeling the behavior of urban agents at
different levels (Waddell, 2002; Waddell et al, 2003).
In recent years agent-based models have gained popularity in revealing the com-
plexity of spatial interactions, dynamics, and self-organization (Parker et al, 2003;
Portugali, 1999). Urban systems have been modeled as complex systems where complex
systematic properties can emerge out of simple interactive rules among different
agents. Some models have examined the evolution of environmentally based land-cover
systems (Brown et al, 2005; Evans and Kelley, 2004; Webster, 2003; Wu and Webster,
1998; 2000) and of human settlement patterns (Sanders et al, 1997). Additionally, there
are some models focusing on residential development modeled in a grid-cell environ-
ment (Berger, 2001; Berger and Ringler, 2002; Manson, 2000; Parker and Filatova,
2008). Other microscopic modeling approaches include fractal growing (Batty, 1991;
Batty and Xie, 1999) and space syntax (Batty and Rana, 2004; Peponis et al, 1998).
Whereas the models provided different insights on the self-organization of urban
clusters, they have not seriously addressed transport costs. Dealing with transport
cost in a more rigorous and mature way, while likely adding to the complexity of the
model, is necessary to gain a better understanding of the effects of networks on spatial
locations.
By explicitly tackling business interactions on supply chains, we employ the agent-
based approach to explain the emergence of retail clusters from a microscopic perspective.
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research appropriates and applies the notions of centripetal and centrifugal forces in
economics (Krugman, 1991a; 1996), indicating that urban space can self-organize into
order and pattern even based on simple and decentralized decisions of individual firms
and consumers.
3T h em o d e l
3.1 Assumptions and definition of cluster
In a simplified three-layer supply chain, products flow from suppliers, via retailers, to
consumers; cash proceeds in the opposite direction. All agents are presumed to have
perfect information; they locate on a circular area of discrete locations. The idea of a
circle, probably first adopted by Hotelling (1929), has the following advantages: (1) one
dimension (which simplifies the model and highlights the embedded economic mech-
anism); (2) providing an enclosed area (which is similar to a de facto geographical
region and limits the number of location choices for retailers).
Two kinds of markets are tested on the basis of this framework: first, a market of
homogeneous goods; second, a market of two complementary goods which entails
consumers' trip-chaining behavior in shopping. The computational models are pro-
grammed in Java, where each agent is modeled as an object. At the beginning of
each round, consumers patronize retailers on the basis of their rules to meet their
needs for the product; after consumers finish shopping, retailers calculate their profits
(revenue ÿ cost) and assess the profitability of other locales. At the end of each round,
given that others are fixed, each retailer moves to the locale that can provide the
highest profit. The locales and profits of retailers are updated for each round.
Before elaborating the agents' rules, it is important to define a cluster for this
research. A cluster is defined as an agglomeration of retailers which are geographically
adjacent or colocated. The density of a cluster is calculated as the number of retailers
in a cluster divided by the number of locales in the cluster. The average cluster density









where ai is the number of retailers in cluster i; ti is the number of locales covered
by cluster i;a n dM represents the total number of clusters. Some examples of calculating
cluster density can be found in figure 1.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure1.[Incoloronline,seehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1068/b36018]Exemplaryretaildistributionpatterns
on a circle of discrete locales. (a) Has five clusters, each of which has only one retailer; therefore
average cluster density equals 1. (b) Has three clusters, one cluster has two adjacent retailers;
one cluster has only one retailer; the final one has two colocating retailers. The average cluster
density equals (2  1  1)/3  1:33. (c) Has two clusters; one cluster has only one retailer,
while the other has four retailers covering three locales. The average cluster density equals
(1  4/3)/2  1:17.
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In a market of homogeneous goods (named x), with Wx the total number of retailers,
a consumer selects a retailer to patronize on the basis of its attractiveness, which
depends on the observable shortest distance between the consumer and the retailer
and other unobservable factors. For example, for consumer p the attractiveness index,
Api, of retailer Rxi (the ith retailer of product x) is represented as:
Api  k1d
ÿb
pi  Ep , (2)
where dpi is the shortest distance between consumer p and retailer i; and k1 and the
scaling parameter b are positive constants. The function indicates that longer travel
distances would generally diminish consumers' willingness to shop. White noise, Ep,
shows a certain degree of randomness.
In a market of two complementary goods sold by two kinds of retailers, let Rxi
indicate retailer i of product x, and Ryj indicate retailer j of product y. A trip is defined
as a round trip for a consumer to travel from home to visit Rxi and Ryj so as to buy
both goods. Given Wx, the number of retailers Rxi, and Wy, the number of retailers
Ryj, there are a total of WxWy trip candidates.







t  Ep .( 3 )
After calculating all retailers' attractiveness indexes, a consumer probabilistically
selects a retailer to patronize. In a market of homogeneous goods the probability for
consumer p to patronize retailer Rxi (indicated by rpi), is calculated on the basis of a






In the market for two complementary goods, the probability for consumer p to visit Ryj
can be similarly calculated.
The roulette wheel selection method is adopted for a consumer to select a retailer
in each round. This approach indicates that retailer i with higher spi for consumer p
has a greater probability to be selected by this consumer. A consumer's probabilities of
patronizing all retailers comprise a wheel of selection, which is updated for every
round. A spin of the wheel selects a retailer; once a retailer is selected, a consumer
buys all needed products from this retailer. The sequence for consumers to patronize
retailers is randomly decided for each round.
3.3 Retailers
Retailers connect suppliers and consumers on supply chains. In each round a retailer
evaluates expected profits of all locales and moves to the locale of the highest profit.












where lx indicates a customer's demand for product x (with a total of N customers);
rpm stands for the probability of consumer p patronizing the retailer in locale m; yx is
the retail unit sales price of product x (a constant in the model); dx is the supplier unit
sales price of x (a constant); u is the transport cost per unit distance per product;
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represents total expected sales of products in locale m. The part in square brackets
refers to expected profit per product, equaling sales price minus cost. A retailer's
cost includes the purchasing cost of products from a supplier and the shipping cost,
which is proportional to shipping distance and quantity of products. Here we assume
that a retailer patronizes its closest supplier. After evaluating profits of all C locales
on the circle, retailer Rxi moves to the locale that provides the highest expected
profit Pxi, given that others are geographically fixed at that time. It is presumed
that each retailer can move only once per round; the sequence of moving is randomly
decided.
3.4 Suppliers
We assume that all suppliers keep the same unit sales price. Moreover, they are evenly
distributed on the circle and are fixed in all rounds. Further, in the market of two
complementary goods, suppliers of the two products colocate. Suppliers can always
produce enough goods to meet market demand.
4 Results and analysis
4.1 The market of homogeneous goods
The basic setting is a circle of 100 discrete locales, where 5000 consumers and 5
suppliers are evenly distributed. Different scenarios are tested with different retail
numbers ranging from 2 to 100. The parameter values of this model (model 1) are
shown in table 1. We examine retail geographical distribution patterns when stable
patterns emerge (ie no retailers change their locales).
Figure 2 shows the numbers of clusters and cluster densities given different num-
bers of retailers. As can be seen, as the number of retailers increases from 2 to 10, the
number of clusters rises to 5 (the same number as suppliers). In particular, when 10
retailers partake in the game, retailers double up at supplier locales; the average cluster
density therefore becomes 2. As more retailers enter the market, the number of clusters
remains flat; retailers in the clusters stay adjacent to each other while centering around
suppliers. The average cluster density declines to 1, while the distribution pattern
Table 1. Values of parameters (model 1: homogeneous goods; model 2: complementary goods).
Variables Description Model 1 Model 2
b distance scaling parameter 1.0 1.0
k1 constant 1 1
C number of locales on the circle 100 100
N number of consumers 5000 5000
K number of suppliers of x 51 0
L number of suppliers of y 10
u unit shipping cost per locale distance ($) 0.02 0.02
yx retail unit sales price of x ($) 2.5 2.5
yy retail unit sales price of y ($) 1.5
dx supplier unit sales price ($) 1.5 1.5
dy supplier unit sales price ($) 1.0
lx individual consumer demand on x 20 20
ly individual consumer demand on y 10
86 A Huang, D Levinsonremains almost symmetric. As the number of retailers approximates 100, which equals
the total number of locales on the circle, all clusters connect with each other and
each cell is occupied by 1 retailer. Some examples of retail distribution patterns are
illustrated in figure 3.
The above analysis indicates that, when the number of retailers is no more than 10,
the centripetal force (proximity to suppliers) induces them to double up in suppliers'
locales, while the centrifugal force (proximity to customers) keeps the distribution
pattern symmetric. As the number of retailers continues to grow, retailers tend to
disperse themselves on the circle; the existence of centripetal force, however, keeps
them near suppliers. Different numbers of retailers in the competition beget different
distribution patterns.
To further explore the effects of the centripetal and centrifugal forces on retail
distribution patterns, sensitivity tests are performed on b and u. When examining
different values of b or u, we set other parameters to be the same as in table 1.
First, we test the value of b from 0.00 to 2.00 (with step size 0.25) and for each case
run the number of retailers from 2 to 30. Figure 4 presents cluster densities for differ-
ent values of b. We observe that, when b is larger than 0.50, retail distribution patterns
are similar to the base case (b  1:00) described above. When b equals 0.00 or 0.25,
the retail pattern differs considerably from other cases.When b equals 0.00 retailers are
evenly distributed and locate only in supplier locales for all scenarios of different
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Figure 2. Number of clusters and average cluster density: (a) number of clusters emerging as the
number of retailers increases from 2 to 100; (b) average cluster density as the number of retailers
increases from 2 to 100.
Why retailers cluster: an agent model of location choice on supply chains 87travel and retailers therefore stay in supplier locales to minimize cost. It is interesting
to see that all retailers mass in only one supplier's locale; cluster density therefore
equals the number of retailers. This is an artifact of the simulation model that retailers
choose the first most profitable pattern and do not consider alternative locales of
exactly equal profits. They might just as easily cluster uniformly or nonuniformly in
any supplier's locale.
We further change the value of u from 0.00 to 0.16, with step size 0.02. Figure 5
shows cluster densities for different values of u.W h e nu is larger than 0.08, retailers
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Figure 4. [In color online.] Average cluster densities for the scenarios with retailers ranging from
2 to 30: results of sensitivity tests on b (scaling parameter).
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 3. [In color online.] Examples of retail distribution patterns for different numbers of
retailers in a market of homogeneous goods [plotted in Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2009)].
(Circles stand for retailers, and triangles represent suppliers. Objects sitting on top of each other
mean that they share the same locale; adjacent objects indicate that they are geographically
adjacent.) (a) Displays the distribution pattern of 5 retailers. (b) Shows the pattern of 10 retailers.
(c)^(f) Respectively, exhibit retail spatial patterns for 20, 30, 60, and 100 retailers.
88 A Huang, D Levinsonnumber of retailers rises to 15, only the case of u equaling 0.16 shows continuing
accumulation of retailers in suppliers' locales, different from the result of our base
case (where u equals 0.02). In particular, in the case of 15 retailers, every 3 retailers stay
in a supplier's locale. When u equals 0.16, although the cluster density curve gradually
falls as the number of retailers continues to increase, a rising trend of cluster density
can still be noticed when the number of retailers ascends from 20 to 25.
4.2 The market of complementary goods
In the market of two complementary goods, we first examine the scenario of 10
suppliers of product x and 10 suppliers of y, every 2 of which colocate and are evenly
distributed on the circle. Table 1 shows the parameter values used in this experiment
(model 2). We first set 20 retailers (10 retailers of product x, 10 retailers of product y).
Since multiple equilibria are possible, 200 different retail initial location patterns (seeds)
are examined.
Given different initial conditions, our results disclose multiple stable patterns,
which can be grouped into three categories by the number of clusters (although each
individual retailer's final locale may vary in different outcomes). The most common
pattern is only one cluster (with probability 0.725), where all retailers accumulate in
a supplier's locale; the patterns of two clusters and three clusters emerge with proba-
bilities of 0.24 and 0.036. All the retail distribution patterns share two features:
(1) retailers stay only in supplier locales; (2) the same number of retailers of x and
retailers of y colocate, indicating that they constitute pairs. It is interesting to notice
that the evenly distributed pattern of retailersöevery one retailer of x and every
one retailer of y double in a supplier's localeödoes not appear in this experiment.
To further explore this possibility, we intentionally set the initial distribution pattern
to be very similar to the evenly distributed one, which ultimately results in the evenly
distributed pattern of retailers.
To understand the impact of the number of retailers on retail distribution patterns,
we further vary the total number of retailers from 4 to 40 while keeping the same





























Figure 5. [In color online.] Average cluster densities for the scenarios with retailers ranging from
2 to 30: results of sensitivity tests on u (unit shipping cost).
Why retailers cluster: an agent model of location choice on supply chains 89be the same as the base case. After testing 200 initial distribution patterns for retailers,
except for the case of 4 retailers, our simulation results reveal multiple retail patterns
for all cases. Figure 6 shows the probabilities for different retail clusters. It is interest-
ing to notice that the pattern of only one cluster has the highest probability to appear
for all cases. Moreover, by observing the trend of the histograms of one cluster for
different numbers of retailers, we can notice that the greater the gap between the
number of retailers and the number of suppliers (which is 10 for each category of pro-
ducts), the more likely that retailers congregate in one cluster. The largest number of
resultant clusters is four; the probability of its happening nonetheless never exceeds 0.05.
But what if we have different numbers of retailers of complementary goods?
We vary the number of retailers of product y from 2 to 16 while fixing the number
of retailers of x to be 10; 200 seeds are also tested for each scenario. The probability
distribution for clusters of different sizes is shown in figure 7. Overall, we find that the
greater the gap between the number of retailers of product x and the number of
retailers of y, the more likely it is that fewer clusters will emerge. Like our previous
results, the case of one cluster has the highest probability to emerge and retailers only
locate in suppliers' locales. Moreover, when there is more than one cluster in the
distribution pattern, the ratio of the number of retailers of x to retailers of y in each
cluster is very close. To illustrate, figure 8 shows some retail distribution patterns for 10
retailers of x and 15 retailers of y. Such interesting phenomena indicate that retailers
can self-organize themselves into clusters of similar structures.
5 Discussion
Our agent model in the market of homogeneous goods and the market of complemen-
tary goods produces the emergence of retail clusters. In a market of homogeneous goods,
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Figure 6. Probability distribution of the numbers of clusters with the number of retailers ranging
from 4 to 40 (where the number of retailers of x equals the number of retailers of y), with total
20 suppliers (10 suppliers of x and 10 suppliers of y). The case of one cluster has the highest
probability to appear of all the cases; the greater the gap between the number of retailers and
the number of suppliers, the more likely that retailers tend to cluster. Additionally, retailers of
x and retailers of y only stay in suppliers' locales and constitute pairs.
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Figure 7. Probability distribution of the number of clusters with 10 retailers of product x and the
number of retailers of y ranging from 2 to 16 (shown in the horizontal axis). The case of only one
cluster has the highest probability to emerge. The greater the gap between the number of retailers
of product x and the number of retailers of product y, the more likely that the case of fewer
clusters will emerge.
Retail cluster of product x
Retail cluster of product y
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8. [In color online.] Some retail distribution patterns (with more than one cluster) in
equilibrium for 10 retailers of x and 15 retailers of y [plotted in Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar,
2009)]. A circle stands for a retail cluster of x; a diamond represents a retail cluster of y.T w o
shapes laid together show that they colocate. The number in each shape indicates the number
of retailers. All retailers are found to stay in supplier locales. In (a) the ratio of the number of
retailers of x to the number of retailers of y for the two clusters respectively equals 3:5 and 7:10.
The ratio of the number of retailers of product to x the number of retailers of product y tends to
be close for the emergent clusters. Similar phenomena can be found for other results.
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incrementally occupy the whole circle. Moreover, a larger scaling parameter (absolute)
value for consumers tends to make retailers more dispersed, and higher unit shipping
cost makes retailers more concentrated around suppliers. Such results exhibit the
balance between proximity to the market and proximity to suppliers which impacts
the retail distribution pattern.
In the market of two complementary goods, multiple equilibria of retail distribu-
tion patterns are found to be common; nevertheless, the case of only one clusterö
where all retailers accumulate in a supplier localeöis most likely to emerge. Moreover,
the greater the gap between the number of retailers of x and the number of retailers
of y, the more likely it is that dense clusters will emerge. A further exploitation suggests
that in the market of homogeneous goods the case of one cluster cannot be stable in that
some retailers in the big cluster can easily move to an open space on the circle to occupy
a larger market. In the model of complementary goods, however, since consumers
consider total travel distance for buying both goods, retail location choice depends
not only on their distance to suppliers and consumers, but also on their distance to
retailers of complementary goods. Furthermore, for the patterns with more than one
cluster, our results imply that emergent clusters, however different in size, tend to have
a similar composition in terms of the ratio of retailers of complementary goods.
In central place theory Christaller (1933) claimed that in the areas with evenly
distributed population and resources, settlements have equidistant spacing between
centers of the same order; high-order services are farther away from low-order services.
Yet this research demonstrates that, even in a market of two equally important prod-
ucts, hierarchical distribution patterns can also autonomously emerge. This comports
with the notion of retail districts found in many cities, such as the Kappabashi district
of Tokyo specializing in kitchen equipment (and plastic sushi) along with similar
examples of clustered competitors (Levinson and Krizek, 2008). In our model of
complementary goods, although the evenly distributed retail pattern can occur under
certain circumstances, to achieve this each cluster requires a very specific timing,
which has a high requirements for initial seeds and the sequence of location choice.
Therefore it is much less likely to emerge naturally than the hierarchical patterns.
Overall, our results find autonomous emergence of retail clusters; the hierarchical
distribution patterns (in particular, the pattern of only one cluster) appear with a
high probability.
6 Conclusion
This paper builds an agent-based model to examine retail location choice on a supply-
chain network of consumers, retailers, and suppliers. In a market of homogeneous
goods we find symmetric retail distribution patterns, and average cluster density
changes dynamically as retailers join the market. These patterns are affected by ship-
ping cost and consumers' willingness to travel. Our findings demonstrate that the
development of a market does not always lead to condensed retail agglomerations.
Moreover, the balance between transportation cost and market size considerably
impacts the size and density of clusters.
In a market of two complementary goods, assuming suppliers of the two products
colocate and evenly distribute themselves, we find self-organizing retail clusters with
features different from the results of the first model. First, multiple equilibria of retail
distributions are common. Second, colocating of retailers of complementary goods
appears with a high probability. Moreover, the likelihood of clustering increases
with the gap between the number of retailers of complementary goods and the gap
between the number of retailers and the number of suppliers. Third, when more than
92 A Huang, D Levinsonone cluster occurs, however different in size, the ratio of the number of retailers of one
product to the number of retailers of the other product tends to be close for the
emergent clusters. Our results illustrate that competition among retailers on supply
chains (especially when considering trip chaining for complementary goods on the part
of the customer) is sufficient to produce clustering; other mechanisms (such as the
desire of customers to comparison shop) are not required, but may also be additional
source of clustering behavior. We have not identified whether there is a necessary
assumption to produce clustering.
Future research should address the efficiency of such self-organized retail patterns
in terms of social welfare, as opposed to a more evenly distributed one (such as posited
in central place theory). Empirical studies should also test the hypotheses presented in
this research.
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